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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines requirements necessary to build a collaborative 
information-sharing system for future war or actions other than war with 
international, coalition, and Non-Government Organization partners. Theater 
Special Operations Commands, and more specifically, Special Operations 
Command Europe, constantly work with partner nations and desire this 
capability. Much of this work is relevant for NATO Special Operations Forces. 
Additionally, this thesis examines potential solutions for a collaborative ISR 
system. 
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The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will 
remain America’s relations with our allies, and our commitment to 
their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly 
cultivated, not just because they are indispensable for U.S. 
interests and national security objectives, but because they are 
fundamental to our collective security. Alliances are force 
multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the 
sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone....we will 
continue to mutually benefit from the collective security provided by 
strong alliances.   
—President Barack Obama 
(Office of the President of the United States 2010) 
 
In alignment with executive guidance, the U.S. military is increasingly 
engaged in collaboration with non-traditional coalition partners, such as non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
and foreign military, governmental, and civilian organizations. The Department of 
Defense (DoD) is also expanding its collaboration with other U.S. departments 
and agencies which are critical to success in many operations other than war, 
and in security cooperation efforts. This paper will discuss the requirements for a 
proposed unclassified information sharing system suitable for use in missions 
that involve U.S. military cooperation with partners that either cannot 
communicate intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR) information at a 
classified level, or which could accelerate the sharing of information to augment 
classified networks with a more agile, albeit limited, data path. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The requirement for a basic ISR sharing system originated with Special 
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), where General Repass (U.S. Army) 
identified it as a priority (McMullen 2012).  He wanted the ability to share ISR 
data with coalition partners in United States European Command (EUCOM) with 
whom U.S. ISR data could not currently be shared. The informal name of this 
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required system was “Blue Collar ISR,” a temporary term chosen to connote that 
this desired information sharing system did not need to have extensive capability 
but instead was intended to satisfy basic ISR data-sharing needs with theater 
partners who had budgetary constraints and capability limitations. Dr. Raymond 
Buettner traveled to Stuttgart, Germany, learned of this requirement, and shared 
it with us, leading us to begin thinking about the problem. 
1. Classification 
One of the first attributes of this information-sharing system that we 
discussed was the highest level of classification necessary. Our initial impression 
from personal experience with current practice was that U.S. ISR information is 
usually classified Secret. That classification poses a very significant challenge to 
sharing with potential foreign partner nations and NGOs. Some partner nations 
hold most of their ISR data at the Confidential or Restricted level and have 
limited systems able to process Secret information and few personnel with the 
requisite clearance.  Other potential partners, such as NGOs, may have no 
capability to process classified information. Nations that have significant 
capability to process classified information are not those for whom a “blue collar” 
ISR solution is needed. The U.S. can already share such data over CENTRIX 
(Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System), BICES 
(Battlefield Intelligence Collection Exploitation System), or other existing, more 
robust, systems, and the addition of a “blue collar” system with less capability 
than provided by existing networks would be redundant (Wills 2012). 
2. Enterprise Purpose 
Since this network is conceived of as supporting specific missions of 
limited duration rather than as a major national network for communicating with 
permanent allies, such as NATO member states, it is helpful to define the 
enterprise under consideration as small and tactical, designed to be rapidly 
deployed in missions where time agility is critical (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Coordination Centre 2008). A likely example of 
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a U.S. military unit that might deploy this network would be a Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (JSOTF), a tactical unit subordinate to one of the Theater 
Special Operations Commands (TSOC) which in turn support one of the six 
geographic Combatant Commanders (US Department of Defense 2007). 
B. THE PROBLEM 
General James Cartwright wrote Information Sharing as a Strategic 
Imperative  in 2006, highlighting the necessity of a culture shift away from “need 
to know” toward “need to share:”  “Success in today’s environment requires 
effectively coordinating all intelligence collection capabilities. The information 
collected must then be made available to a wide range of customers based on a 
secured need-to-share basis rather than the old need-to-know threshold” (J. E. 
Cartwright 2006). 
The problem this thesis addresses is the challenge of sharing relevant but 
unclassified ISR or other information with coalition partners, which include not 
only foreign militaries, but IGOs, NGOs, and others, depending on the mission. 
The 9/11 Commission’s conclusions as to intelligence-sharing 
within the U.S. intelligence community apply equally to intelligence-
sharing with foreign liaison services: “Current security requirements 
nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentalization of 
information among agencies. Each agency’s incentive structure 
opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal 
administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information.” 
Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone 
recognized this problem within the Defense Department and issued 
a memo to defense intelligence agencies that stated, “Incorrect use 
of the NOFORN [U.S.-only consumers] caveat on DoD information 
has impeded the sharing of classified national defense information 
with allies and coalition partners.” Cambone subsequently 
prescribed new means to ensure the widest dissemination of 
intelligence information and demanded that for “intelligence under 
the purview of the DoD, originators shall use the ‘Releasable to’ (rel 
to) marking, and any subsequently approved releasability marking 
to the maximum extent possible.” In the war on terror, sharing is the 
norm. (Reveron 2006) 
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1. What Isn’t Working in the Current Paradigm 
The current way that the U.S. tends to handle most intelligence data is to 
import it all to SIPRNet once it is gathered. This is the domain that U.S. military 
intelligence analysts use for most of their work, and the necessity of having at 
least a Secret security clearance to access the network is no impediment since 
they all have at least that level of clearance. SIPRNet supports information that is 
Secret or below, so working on that network permits the inclusion of unclassified 
data, since data of lower levels of classification can easily move to a domain of a 
higher classification, it just cannot flow in the other direction. When information 
on SIPRNet needs to be shared with a foreign coalition partner nation, as it often 
is in EUCOM, then use is made of tools like DISA (Defense Information Systems 
Agency) Europe’s Releasable De-Militarized Zone (REL-DMZ), a region of 
SIPRNet from which NOFORN information is excluded and where partner 
nations with Secret networks can access Secret Releasable data from their 
Secret network by means of an intermediate cross domain guard, or gateway. 
C. LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE 
Mission sets such as Humanitarian Assistance or Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
often require an information sharing solution that can be deployed to remote 
locations and achieve operational capability very quickly to facilitate 
communication between governmental and non-governmental organizations from 
various nations during the initial hours after a disaster. A hypothetical network 
designed to meet these purposes will be small and limited in scope of users and 
size of infrastructure to the mission, and it will be designed to operate for a 
limited duration. 









• Mutual Benefit 
• Centralized Decision Making 
• Trusted Network 
• Data Inputs 
• Technology 
• Interoperability 
For brevity, we will give a name to the proposed network that addresses 
these requirements.  Koinonia is a classical term that refers to sharing, or 
participation in a shared endeavor, and so we will name our hypothetical network 
with a word that describes its purpose.  Koinonia, then, is a notional network that 
is conceived of as other than a U.S. national network. This network cannot exist 
as an exclusively U.S. classified network. As defined in the latest Intelligence 
Community Classification Guidance Findings and Recommendations Report: 
Thus, according to the President of the United States, only 
information owned by, produced four, or under the control of the 
U.S. government that could cause harm if disclosed in an 
unauthorized manner and contained in one of the eight categories 
above may be classified. (Director of National Intelligence and 
Chief Information Officer 2008) 
It may be desirable to have a network that is not an exclusively military or 
federal government network. When the federal government is a partner with 
other organizations, the information resident within a connecting network may 
need to be unclassified. Sensitive but unclassified data is the type of information 
used by Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Secure Intranet 
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(RISSNET), and the RISS Automated Trusted Information Exchange (RISS 
ATIX). The DOJ’s (Department of Justice) Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 
network is sensitive but unclassified, as is the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal System, and 
their flagship Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), with its thirty-five 
communities of interest (United States Government Accountability Office 2007). 
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II. RELATED WORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information sharing has been a challenge for coalition operations for as 
long as different organizations have attempted to cooperate. Developments in 
technologies have not always eased the challenge, but military doctrine and case 
studies point out ways to mitigate the difficulty. The following doctrinal 
publications and studies will be reviewed in this chapter. 
Title Topic 
Joint Intelligence Publication 2–0 Joint Intelligence 
Joint Intelligence Publication 2–01 Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations 
Joint Intelligence Publication 3–05.1 Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations 
Help a Brother Out: A Case Study and 
Multinational Intelligence Sharing, 
NATO SOF 
Building keys to sharing intelligence in 
NATO Special Operations 
Case study: Intelligence – Open-
source data analytics 
Cost savings and analytics in using 
social networking. 
On Facilitating Stability Operations: a 
Net Centric, Federated Approach to 
Information Sharing 
Use of APAN for unclassified 
information sharing. 
Testbed for Tactical Networking and 
Collaboration 
A testbed environment for sharing 
technologies 
Table 1.   References for related work. 
A. JOINT OPERATIONS 
Military doctrine is codified in publications which serve as a foundation for 
any work on the subjects they address.  Our analysis of requirements and goals 
begins with joint doctrine. 
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1. Joint Intelligence Publication 2–0 
The Joint Intelligence Publication outlines very clearly the goals and 
requirements for joint, interagency, and multinational intelligence sharing and 
cooperation: 
Being faster and better requires having unfettered access to the 
collection, processing, and dissemination of information derived 
from all available sources. Information sharing, cooperation, 
collaboration, and coordination are enabled by an intelligence and 
information sharing environment that fully integrates joint, 
multinational, and interagency partners in a collaborative 
enterprise. This type of collaborative intelligence sharing 
environment must be capable of generating and moving 
intelligence, operational information, and orders where needed in 
the shortest possible time. The architecture supporting this type of 
environment must be dynamic, flexible, and capable of providing 
multinational partners and interagency participants rapid access to 
appropriate data. It must facilitate the capability of the IC to focus 
on supporting the JFC and subordinate joint force components and 
to integrate support from non-DoD agencies and NGOs as needed. 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2007) 
Many salient points to our topic can be derived from this paragraph. The 
first of which is the importance of sufficiently inclusive access. The use of terms 
like “unfettered access” in the context of joint intelligence doctrine highlights the 
great importance of overcoming roadblocks to getting necessary information to 
partners in operations, as opposed to treating useful information as a resource 
that becomes more valuable to its possessor the more tightly the secret is 
protected from partners or competing intelligence communities. That access 
enables full participation of our partners through a better understanding and 
better ability to collaborate on a topic. Simply, the more they know the more they 
can participate. The second point concerns the necessity of an information 
sharing enterprise that facilitates collaboration beyond DoD borders. Such 
collaboration can only occur when there exists a system by which all of the 
different parties can come together to work on a topic. The nature of military 
information dictates that the enterprise will require a certain degree of security, 
but the security requirement cannot be permitted to override the requirement that 
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the enterprise also be flexible and accessible.  It necessary to consider how 
availability to all collaborating parties can best be extended with the desired 
amount of information offered, without compromising classified information or 
jeopardizing information assurance.  
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 Notional Multinational Intelligence Architecture (From U.S. Department Figure 1. 
of Defense 2007). 
Examining the notional multinational intelligence architecture, shown in 
Figure 1, one can see several critical links labeled Multinational LAN. This 
implies the existence of a network available to all partners as it exists inside the 
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staff planning loop, as well as outside, connecting U.S. and allied forces; 
however there is no specific system or network purpose-built to handle this job 
for all missions. Note that the diagram refers to “Multinational LAN” even more 
frequently than to U.S. classified networks.  Given such importance, it is 
noteworthy that no single system exists to serve this role.  Instead of being 
designed for a given mission, networks are customized for a specific set of 
participating nations, and if those participants change, a new network with a 
potentially new classification may be necessary.  BICES and the various 
enclaves of CENTRIX, for example, are classified networks that cannot 
dynamically adjust to changing partner nation participation in a given mission and 
lack the flexibility to accommodate participation by partners that communicate 
exclusively at the unclassified level.   
Personal experience has shown that in the absence of a network designed 
as a flexible multinational LAN, great efforts are made to extend access to U.S. 
classified networks to a very select group of partner nations, while all other allied 
forces are left out of the network and must solicit hand-me-down reports from 
those with access. Although this approach permits the exchange of classified 
data, the access limitations attendant to this capability necessarily result in a 
network that does not fit the requirements of a collaborative sharing environment 
called for in Joint Intelligence Publication 2–0. It does not allow all partners rapid 
access to appropriate data. 
Further, the requirements stipulate the capacity to integrate nonmilitary 
agencies and organizations. In much the same manner, there is no dedicated 
system or network by which these organizations can collaborate with the U.S. 
military. Attempts have been made to overcome the shortfall. The All Partners 
Access Network (APAN), for example, was originally built for just such a purpose. 
Despite adoption at the national level after its initial success in PACOM, APAN 
has not seen worldwide utilization. This will be further evaluated in a later 
section. 
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2. Joint Intelligence Publication 2–01 
While there is unquestionably a great deal of information which is 
appropriately classified, maintained on U.S. classified networks, and therefore 
cannot be shared, interagency and multinational partnerships require us to look 
for options and materials which can be shared on a multinational LAN capable of 
processing material which could be jointly accessed and shared in multinational 
and multi-organizational operations. We narrow the problem scope by looking at 
the individual components that provide for joint intelligence. The Joint Publication 
2–01, Joint and National Support to Military Operations, outlines a type of 
intelligence which is available to all parties: Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) 
(U.S. Department of Defense 2012). Figure 2 lists many of the open-source 
information sources, all of which are unclassified and available to all members of 
any coalition operation in which the U.S. military might participate. 
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 Open-Source Information Sources (From U.S. Department of Defense Figure 2. 
2012). 
Web-based communities and user-generated content are especially 
significant, since social networking, video sharing, wiki, and blog sites may easily 
be interacted with on an unclassified network connected to the public internet.  
These information sources may be very valuable to a multinational or inter-
agency network. 
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3. Joint Intelligence Publication 3–05.1 
a. Communications Systems Support 
A primary requirement for communications among SOF forces is 
interoperability. They must have the ability to interact with conventional forces, 
government organizations, NGOs, and IGOs. This may entail the use of not only 
state-of-the-art systems, but also less sophisticated systems, in an effort to 
maximize collaboration and communication of joint parties (US Department of 
Defense 2007). Frequently multiple alternative communication systems can be 
used to accomplish this task; however, simplifying the overall scheme of 
communications is always best, as it minimizes the technological support burden 
and risk of failure. 
The fundamental architectural tenants of SOF communications 
expand upon this idea.  Highlighted in Figure 3, and especially important when 
dealing in coalition communications, are the tenants of seamless architecture, 
standards compliance, and protected communications. These tenets will apply 
directly to the architecture of Koinonia, since a network built to facilitate broad 
information sharing may fail if there are capability gaps that prevent 
interoperability, or if standards are either not defined or not followed, or if 
compromise turns the network into a liability. 
 
 Special Operations Communication System Architecture Figure 3. 
Fundamentals Tenants (From US Department of Defense 2007). 
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b. Information Management 
There are three forms in which digital information should be 
managed: information sharing, collaboration, and force tracking. Information 
sharing, while it may have a tangible aspect, can be more readily accomplished 
by electronic means, potentially promoting efficiency and aiding synchronization 
of effort. Collaboration requires that the shared information be held in such a 
manner that multiple parties can contribute to its development and plan from it. 
Force tracking, usually done via a Common Operational Picture (COP), improves 
situational awareness and supports the expeditious and accurate granting of 
clearance for fires, as well as reducing the need for friendly units to pass their 
position verbally (US Department of Defense 2007). 
In combat operations, information is kept on classified networks. 
This is justified, as it protects people, data, and planning from hostile actions. 
However, in operations other than war, the ability to share data can be extremely 
valuable when coordinating across multiple organizations and nationalities. 
Further, disparate types of data need not be held on the same domain. For 
example, force tracking may be conducted on a classified network, while 
information-sharing collaboration can be performed on a multinational LAN. The 
placement of the information should be on the network that provides the greatest 
advantage for the coalition forces without entailing excessive risk. 
B. HELP A BROTHER OUT 
This thesis examines how to optimize intelligence sharing in a 
coalition by a thorough literature review and site visits to 
intelligence sharing organizations in order to establish best 
practices for multinational intelligence sharing. The newly 
established NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) in Mons, Belgium 
was treated as a test case to validate their intelligence sharing 
procedures and structures in reference to the authors’ identified 
best practices: mutual gains and benefits;  trust; direct control; and 
accessibility and interoperability. 
Intelligence support to SOF is a decisive factor, when in 
conventional operations it often is not; therefore intelligence support 
to SOF is special - NATOSOF is no exception. The level of 
intelligence support to SOF normally only exists at the national 
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level, due to bureaucratic obstacles, a need to protect sensitive 
sources and capabilities, and lack of trust. The NSHQ is 
experimenting with several innovative methods to enhance trust 
and streamline intelligence capability amongst NATO SOF forces. 
There are structural and organizational lessons learned from the 
establishment of the NSHQ that can be applied to future operations 
and coalitions. (Ara, Brand and A 2011) 
The work that NATO is doing within the realm of collaboration is relevant 
to finding the requirements and solution sets for coalition information sharing. In 
this humorously titled thesis, NATO officers looked up processes which could 
improve information sharing and processes which could be valuable in any 
collaborative situation involving multiple nations and organizations. In their study, 
they found five keys to increasing the efficiency of intelligence support to SOF 
forces 
1. Mutual Benefit from Coalition Membership  
There is a benefit of improved force effectiveness when partner nations 
collaborate towards a common goal. The argument is not that the combination 
produces a necessarily better product, but that when trying to rely on a single 
national domain, gathering the intelligence can be time-consuming, problematic, 
and potentially unreliable for other nations. It is simply too hard for others to get 
and share if information belongs to just one nation. Rather, if you build your 
intelligence as a partnership it becomes faster and easier to access, and more 
reliable (Ara, Brand and A 2011). 
2. Trust and Competency Established Among the Members 
Repetitive training exercises and common training programs have resulted 
in frequent collaboration amongst NATO’s relatively small SOF community. This 
repeated contact allows a buildup of trust amongst personnel, as well as, (and 
perhaps more importantly than) trust in the capabilities of partner nations. When 
partners are united by a common goal and share the workload, creating an 
enterprise by which to share information can become much easier (Ara, Brand 
and A 2011). 
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3. Centralized Decision Making 
The capabilities and influence of the United States can support 
standardization for multinational requirements and benchmarks. Processes can 
begin with those previously established by the U.S. and capabilities can be 
expanded by mimicking those that are or are being developed. A federated 
approach to network management is promising (Ara, Brand and A 2011). 
4. Increased Use of COTS Equipment and Open Source 
Information 
Advocating the use of immediately accessible technology, through 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and open source information, will 
help to fill the gaps present in the NATO SOF networks (Ara, Brand and A 2011). 
In 2007, most NATO SOF units did not have access to NATO systems at the 
headquarters or tactical levels. The BICES system was selected for the classified 
NATO network (Dron 2009). Several examples are used to illustrate the cost-
effective use of COTS and of secured but unclassified data stores. Obtaining 
inexpensive equipment and using it at the local level has improved their 
efficiency by cutting out the bureaucracy in dealing with national level systems 
(Ara, Brand and A 2011). 
5. Secure or Trusted Network 
Realizing there is no easy access to national level intelligence services; 
NATO SOF increased their effectiveness by building homegrown capabilities. 
These have been modeled after individual national systems, which are already in 
place. By placing it at a level where it is accessible to all coalition forces, the 
information on the system is made relevant to the operators (Ara, Brand and A 
2011). This is effectively shown in the words of Gen. David Petraeus, in an 
address to the NATO Secretary General: 
Over the past three months, SOF elements carried out more than 
4,000 total operations that captured or killed 235 insurgent leaders 
and more than 2,500 lower-level fighters – likely an unprecedented 
number in the history of SOF. The increase in SOF successes also 
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results from improved ISR capabilities, our improved abilities to 
fuse intelligence, increased partnering efforts with Afghan Special 
Forces, and improved capabilities of our Afghan SOF partners. 
(Petraeus 2010) 
C. ALL PARTNERS ACCESS NETWORK (APAN) 
Catastrophes around the globe which call upon humanitarian assistance 
and disaster relief efforts require a collaborative environment for the various 
military and civilian responders. One such environment comes in the form of the 
All Partners Access Network. As an unclassified work, analyzing the APAN 
program proves a valuable resource for indicating requirements and solutions for 
a multinational, multi-organization operation 
1. Background 
Evidenced in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Basin Tsunami of 2004, 
the U.S. DoD required a method for sharing unclassified information amongst the 
variety of government and nongovernment organizations and militaries 
cooperating on casualty response (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). 
Quickly realizing the traditional web was not enough, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Networks and Information Integration informed his staff of the need 
to communicate, collaborate, translate, and engage in order to share unclassified 
information more readily and increase the overall effectiveness of the U.S. 
response (R. K. Ackerman 2006).  This idea was a departure from the typical 
attempt to exercise command and control (C2) through classified networks. 
Given the state of the actors, classified networks were not a viable option 
(Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). 
The Unclassified Information Sharing (UIS) Enterprise Service (ES) is 
maturing in the “dot mil” network. However, its rigid structure and designed 
limitations fail to satisfy the requirements for responsiveness, and flexibility 
(Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). Instead, a goal for Koinonia should be to 
enable agile C2 (Alberts and Hayes 2007) with an expanded set of possible 
partner entities. Alberts and Hayes go on to explore various C2 elements in a 
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complex operational environment to provide a framework for emerging elements. 
Future C2 systems will rely on information shared in an unclassified environment, 
as there is a correlation between development of C2 systems and information 
sharing (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011).  Broad information sharing and 
collaboration with NGOs or non-allied nations, which may be necessary in 
complex endeavors, is only possible in an unclassified environment.  
2. Early Unclassified Web Presence 
APAN originated in the U.S. Pacific Command as part of an effort to share 
information with multinational partners in Multinational Planning Augmentation 
Team (MPAT) (Tempest Express Fact Sheet 2011). It was a simple website used 
for file sharing and a one-way publishing mechanism for posting publicly 
releasable information on exercises. The website gained portal features and 
became more operationally sensitive for impact members. At that time it was 
known as the Asian Pacific Access Network. It was in the assistance efforts after 
the tsunami in the Indian Ocean basin which showed the potential of the site, as 
it proved to be the only effective mechanism for the various responders to de-
conflict their efforts (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). 
3. Transnational Information Sharing Cooperation Joint Concept 
Technology Demonstration 
     The Transnational Information Sharing Cooperation (TISC) Joint 
Concept Technology Demonstration (JCTD) started in fiscal year (FY) 2007. Its 
goal is to foster information sharing amongst U.S. military, U.S. government and 
other less traditional mission partners by implementing social networking 
practices, capabilities, and concepts into a portal environment. Funding has been 
allocated to transition from a demonstration platform to a shared enterprise 
service available to Combatant Commands in support of unclassified operations. 
Capabilities are expected to include wiki, blog, chat, translation, geospatial 
information tools, advanced search, Word Cloud Maps, Single Sign-On, Really 
Simple Syndication (RSS), Simple Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia 
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Message Service (MMS). This provides Geographic Combatant Command 
(GCC) agility when the tools are partnered with policy authorities to engage in 
operations with nontraditional mission partners and an unclassified dot org 
environment. Information sharing between the dot org and dot mil environments 
allow for coordination and collaboration on critical issues (Chlebo, Christman and 
Johnson 2011). 
4. JCTD to an Enterprise Service  
The Office of the Secretary Of Defense (OSD) Director for Cost 
Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE) directed DISA to implement the UIS ES 
for the DoD via Resource Memorandum Decision - 700. Requirements for the 
transition of the JCTD concept to an ES were vetted and approved by the DoD 
CIO. Putting aside further development of existing technologies, in order to use 
the service as planned, meets the requirements of the Clinger Cohen Act.  In this 
way, the DoD CIO is realizing information technology efficiencies across the 
Department (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). 
5. Network Design for an Agile UIS 
A newly formed Stability Operations Community of Interest took a year to 
examine case studies, create a problem statement, and build a high level 
roadmap for capabilities (G. Christman 2009). A follow-on pilot program 
combined multiple services to demonstrate a conceptual model for 
comprehensive approach to civil-military information sharing (G. Christman 




  Conceptual model of a comprehensive approach to CIM information sharing (From Christman 2010). Figure 4. 
 22 
The Director, Operation Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) published 
findings on the Joint Civil Information Management (JCIM) Joint Test and 
Evaluation (JT&E). The findings were used to produce the Techniques Tactics 
and Procedures (TTP) handbook for Civil Information Management (CIM) in 
order to standardize assessment methods and information management 
processes (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). The conceptual model 
from Figure 4 utilizes these findings. Further development of this concept has 
begun throughout the services. U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), the U.S. Army, and U.S. Marine Corps have all initiated 
programs for CIM (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). 
6. Further Development 
With connection points between the “.mil,” ".org,” and the”.mil” 
domains, and data paths to NATO allies, the UIS can act as a hub for coalition 
operations. Leveraging work done in the pilot program with models 
constructed in the unclassified core enterprise (Chlebo, Christman and 
Johnson 2011) with further this growth. The mediation service must be 
developed in order to link these environments to leverage those pivot points 
(G. Christman 2010). 
Three specific areas need to be developed in order to create a data-
related hub from which to work. We discussed the first area in the open-
source data mining section. It involves intelligent agent-based technologies 
and improved data mining methods in order to make the most of the data 
available in the UIS (Chisolm 2007). The second is consolidation of 
authoritative databases (Daniel, Goh and Yusop 2007). The third is to develop 
machine-readable data for use in a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and 
to apply Business Intelligence to determine where and what data is being 
pulled in order to best meet the needs of the customer (Hammergren and 
Simon 2009). 
7. Meeting the Need for Information 
The first step in undertaking any challenge is to understand the 
requirement and how to address it. However, unlike civilian businesses where 
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the environment is generally steady, the military deploys into situations where 
the unknown far outweighs the known. The goal for information gatherers is to 
flip that ratio as quickly as possible. This concept is illustrated in the 
information versus time graph of Figure 5. The Haiti earthquake is an example 
of such a scenario in which the information gap prevented early and effective 
application of resources (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). The 
response to Haiti benefited from the rise of social media through 
crowdsourced crisis response (Hester, Shaw and Biewald 2010). 
 
  Illustration of available and required information over time (From Figure 5. 
Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011).  
Data gathered through outsourcing over cellular tower networks can be 
used in several toolsets. As illustrated in Figure 4 of the conceptual model, 
Ushahidi, Sahana, and Open Street Map provide a mechanism to gather, 
store, and display information generated socially. Receipt of that information 
can come from any device with SMS capability. The widespread availability of 
cell phones enables interested, helpful parties to quickly provide information 
to responders, thus closing the information gap. This was the case in Haiti 
(Hester, Shaw and Biewald 2010). 
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Areas to investigate in using the crowd sourcing technique include 
vetting, standardization in messaging, and the required level of trust, or 
security, in the portal (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 2011). These should 
not be seen as reasons not to crowdsource, but as challenges to address, 
because the effectiveness of crowd sourcing has been demonstrated. For 
example, crowdsourced reports saved lives during the Haitian earthquake 
response (McKenna 2010). 
The key to taking advantage of crowd source information lies in well-
defined conditions for use, such as the following five proposed by Euchner 
(2010): 
1) The problem (and its boundary conditions) must be well 
defined; 2) The population of potential solvers with relevant 
expertise must be large, 3) Feedback must be provided to the 
crowd (not just to individual contributors) so that ideas can 
evolve, 4) Mechanisms for managing intellectual property must 
be in place, and 5) Someone needs to filter the ideas (and 
develop them). 
When these conditions are met, crowdsourced information may have 
significant value.    
 25 
III. ANALYSIS OF VARIOUS INFORMATION-SHARING 
EFFORTS 
A. CHALLENGES FOR SHARING INFORMATION 
1. Usability or Security 
There are tradeoffs to make in the areas of security and usability. The 
most stringent security measures would result in a classified system only 
usable by cleared personnel. Since Koinonia is designed to enable 
information sharing between a wide set of potential collaborators, including 
those who lack clearance, such measures would not be appropriate. There 
are other security measures that should be employed to enhance information 
assurance on unclassified systems.   
2. Interoperability as a Requirement 
EUCOM’s Combined Endeavor exercise involves rigorous tests of 
multinational communications systems. One of the findings of those tests is 
that network interoperability can be made challenging by national policies 
(Gateau 2012).  Some nations require the exclusion of foreign network 
administrators from their national intranet, blocking access at their router. 
Other nations will permit their allies to manage network traffic up to their 
firewall, and will then permit visibility but not control one level beyond that 
firewall. A federated management approach, which permits network 
administrators of cooperating nations to ensure the compliance of their 
networks with the overall requirements, has been successful. Taking such an 
approach with Koinonia would result in organizations retaining control of their 
own hardware and configurations, but has the drawback of potentially 
depending on administrators with less capable tools, or skill, to enforce the 
compliance of their portion of the network with security and interoperability 
standards. One method of mitigating that risk without asking nations or 
organizations to surrender control of their networks is to provide them with 
liaisons that do not control their network, but whom they permit to view its 
configuration and observe its compliance. Granting such a liaison permission 
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to monitor but not alter network configuration may be a useful method of 
ensuring trust between information-sharing partners. 
3. Transition to Their Fight: After U.S. Withdrawal 
The withdrawal of U.S. forces from an area of operations potentially 
creates a void in capabilities in a variety of areas, such as combat power, 
logistics, and manpower, among others.  The loss of capability in these areas 
can be mitigated by foreign weapon sales, use of local resources, and training 
of local personnel.  The greatest loss may come from the withdrawal of the 
networks and U.S.-owned information-sharing platforms. 
A sudden void in the collection, management, and exploitation of data 
is difficult for any country to fill, particularly for those already facing resource 
constraints.  For missions where U.S. involvement is likely to terminate before 
the mission’s conclusion, partner nations need a platform which they may rely 
upon from the beginning of the engagement, and which they have a 
reasonable expectation of keeping and maintaining after the departure of U.S. 
forces. 
B. EXAMINATION OF POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
In an effort to find potential solutions, we will look at systems already in 
place, systems under development, and pieces of technology key to 
connecting the systems. We will conclude this examination by analyzing the 
shortfalls of these systems to identify the requirements of Koinonia. 
1. APAN: All Partners Access Network 
The All Partners Access Network, formerly the Asia-Pacific Area 
Network, was created by PACOM to use public domain materials and web-
based technology to support PACOM’s security cooperation initiatives. The 
portal went live in March of 2000 and was used primarily for Humanitarian 
Assistance / Disaster Relief missions, partnership building, and joint 
exercises. 
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a. Examine APAN as Data Sharing Model 
APAN serves as a collection of hosted files, with associated 
tools, accessible with a username and password through a web portal. It 
cannot stream live data. Files need to be complete in order to be uploaded 
and hosted, so a video of something taking place in real time could not be 
shared, because the file is still being created. Once the file is saved and is not 
being written it can be uploaded to APAN, but a live VTC (Video 
Teleconference) or live stream from a security camera could not be shared 
across APAN. 
b. Limitations of APAN 
(1) Cannot do tactical ISR feeds. APAN has a 
limitation in that the maximum file size that can be uploaded to the portal 
is 100MB.   That size limitation does not permit for high-resolution video 
of any significant duration.  (For reference, 150MB per minute is a typical 
size requirement for a resolution of 1080p, although this will vary by 
compression method and subject matter.) 
(2) No real-time sharing on the portal.  APAN does not 
support live streams, whether of video or audio. Uploads to the portal 
consist of completed files, not files that are currently being written. 
(3) Human in the loop: must go looking for data. 
APAN does support communities of interest, so that a user can sign up 
for only relevant communities in an effort to avoid being inundated with 
information that is not of interest to him. This still means that a user will 
need to log in to APAN frequently and look for recently uploaded 
information if his work requires near real-time collaboration.  
(4) Use of APAN creates a functional dependency on 
U.S. networks.  APAN is a DISA product, and its servers are military 
property. This is not necessarily a problem, but it is a theoretical 
possibility that if U.S. or DoD involvement in a particular mission or area 
ended or became unfunded, that the network resources could be 
reallocated to other tasks, leaving former partners in the lurch. Using U.S. 
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military servers as the sole central repository for all data may not be 
universally desirable. 
2. CWIX: Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, 
eXperimentation and eXamination 
The Coalition Warrior Interoperability eXploration, 
eXperimentation and eXamination eXercise (CWIX) programme 
provides an opportunity for NATO Nations, Partner Nations, 
Contact Nations, and NATO Agencies to prove, disprove, and 
improve NATO CIS interoperability. 
CWIX is a major initiative to test, assess, and improve the 
interoperability of NATO and national CIS systems with 
particular emphasis on those that would be deployed with 
NATO-led operations such as ISAF, Active Endeavour, KFOR 
and Operation Ocean Shield or within a NATO Response Force 
(NRF). CWIX 2013 is focused on addressing specific command 
and control issues in ISAF and the future mission network 
(FMN). (NATO 2013) 
3. Commercial Applications 
a. TARGETR 
An example of commercially available unclassified intelligence 
innovation, Atlascraft has developed a product called Targetr to draw upon 
and fuse large sets of unclassified data to create powerful intelligence 
products and predictive capabilities.  Targetr examines the relationships 
between data sets and attributes that include vessel AIS data, port records, 
names, and business contact information to detect anomalies and threats and 
identifies discrepancies between predicted and detected behavior.  This data 
can be gathered from publically available internet sources, or purchased, as 
from a vendor such as Orbcomm or ExactEarth, both of which own satellites 
which collect AIS (Automatic Identification System) transmissions from 
shipping.  Targetr is able to display the results of its fusion processes, 
including tracking information on a vector-based map, such as the geographic 
information systems developed by NASA or Google. 
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4. Current Collaborative Networks 
There are several existing networks that address information-sharing  
needs that have similar, but not identical, requirements to that of Koinonia. 
These networks are large, permanent, and are capable of handling classified 
data.  
a. FMN: Future Mission Network 
FMN is designed to permit hasty network setup for coalition 
missions, enable releasable Secret communications between multinational 
military units in no more time than it would take to establish national networks 
like SIPRNet or NIPRNet. They are colloquially referred to as “Human to 
Human” communication services (Leca 2012).  The list of these core services 
is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   “Human to Human” communication services (From Leca 2012). 
The goal of quick setup is one which it would share with the 
hypothetical Koinonia network, but the more robust capability that FMN 
delivers in enabling classified communication would necessarily limit the 
potential partners with whom U.S. military units could connect. There may 
nations with whom the U.S. might work on a FID (Foreign Internal Defense) 
mission, or a HA/DR mission, but with whom the U.S. cannot share Secret 
data. This restriction on which organizations FMN could make into potential 
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information-sharing partners also applies to NGOs, which can only 
communicate at the unclassified level. 
NATO has a draft FMN profile that will be tested against the 
U.S. Mission Partner Environment (MPE) profile in NATO’s 2013 CWIX 
exercise at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), in Bydgoszcz, Poland. 
The testing areas and partners are outlined in Table 3 below. The U.S. MPE 
has previously gone by the name of FMN, which in turn developed from the 
Afghanistan Mission Network (AMN).  
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Table 3.   FMN testing areas and participants (From Allied Command Transformation Command & Control Deployability & 
Sustainability 2013). 
SITE  NETWORK Core Enterprise Services CD Cap 
Core Enterprise Services 





















Canada (CAN) CTE2 X X X X X X   
DENMARK (DEN) CWIX     X         
C4AD - Suffolk CTE2 X X X X X X X 
NETHERLANDS (NLD) CWIX X X X X X X   
FRANCE (FRA) CTE2     X         
FINLAND (FIN) Distributed CWIX X   X X X     
NATO JWC CWIX X X X X X     
NCIA - IETV CWIX     X     X X 
NCIA - Mons CTE2 X X X X X     
NCIA - T Hague CTE2   X X X X X   
USA - JITC- IH CTE2 X   X     X X 
USA - CTSF CTE2 X X X X X X X 
USA - NATEX - Mons CTE2 X X X X X X X 
SWE - Bydg CWIX X   X X X     
SWE - Enkoping CTE2 X X X X X X   
GBR - Blandford CTE2 X X X X X     
GBR (MET) TBD                 
USA - C4AD - Bdyg CWIX X X X X X X X 
ITA - Bydg CWIX X X X X X X   
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b. CENTRIX: Combined Enterprise Regional Information 
Exchange System 
CENTRIX is perhaps the most important information exchange 
system linking coalition military partners to U.S. forces. It permits the 
exchange of up to Secret Releasable information between participating 
nations. NGOs do not have access. There are lots of separate networks with 
specific purposes and clearly defined users, including bilateral agreements 
between the U.S. and one other nation, regional enclaves with several 
participating nations, and mission-specific enclaves where national 
participation may change over time. These various networks do not 
communicate, and must be entirely separate, even when the same countries 
have access to the same CENTRIX enclaves. This may necessitate a U.S. 
military unit running several different instances of CENTRIX and 
communicating with different nations about the same event on each, with no 
ability to “forward,” “copy,” or “paste” data between them. Making a real-time 
report to all coalition partners in an area with such overlap can mean literally 
typing the same words into three or more different laptops so that military 
partners from three or more different nations are informed.  
c. GCTF: Global Counter-Terrorism Task Force 
This is one of the CENTRIX enclaves, used in CENTCOM by 
naval forces working near the Horn of Africa or in the Arabian Gulf. CENTRIX-
GCTF was also used in Afghanistan, where as many as 66 different nations 
participated in Operation Enduring Freedom. 
d. BICES: Battlefield Information Collection & 
Exploitation System 
A powerful new model network for sharing information at a 
classified level, BICES suffers from an information gap, meaning that 
information does not go directly to it natively, but is transferred to it from the 
national classified networks of some two dozen NATO nations.  Some of this 
gap between what is available on SIPRNet, for example, and on BICES may 
be attributed the relative immaturity of the network, which has had only a few 
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years of operational life in which to amass data from collections.  (BICES and 
SIPRNet are capable of processing information of the same level of 
classification.)  A second problem stems from the lack of trust in the new 
network.  Familiarity with the system is increasing and more NATO countries 
are using the network, so more material is being gathered.  However, the 
greatest obstacle still exists for BICES; namely, the lack of dedicated feeds 
into the system.  Countries collect material on national systems, authorized it 
for disclosure, and then transfer it to BICES.  In order to be a successful 
information collection and exploitation platform, BICES would require direct 
feeds, but it is not intended to fill that role and was designed as a connection 
between national networks.  The desirability of direct feeds will be true for 
Koinonia as well, especially since it would be even harder to transfer even 
releasable information from a classified domain such as SIPRNet to an 
unclassified domain.   
5. Mobile Communications 
A network designed to quickly support collaboration with a wide range 
of partners in various environments needs to be deployable, rapidly 
configurable, scalable, and rugged. Since mobile 3G technologies such as 
GSM (Global System for Mobile) are so prevalent, a network that can 
incorporate its use will greatly expand the number of devices and users that 
can reach it. For example, if a network employed during a HA/DR effort is able 
to accept an MMS containing an image of an urgent need and metadata 
containing a geotag from a local policeman, then the number of local 
information reporters can be quickly expanded.  In addition to local users, 3G 
mobile technology is also typically available to aid volunteers, NGO workers, 
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IV. DATA AND PROCESS ANALYSIS 
After background research and literature review, we analyzed the 
difficulties inherent in sharing information to coalition partners across 
classification domains. To do this, we relied on an ongoing series of 
experiments that involved information gathering with coalition partners. One 
such experiment was conducted June 6–14, 2012. This was Tactical 
Networking Testbed (TNT) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) experiment 
entitled Networking And Interagency Collaboration On Small Craft Maritime 
Source Nuclear Radiological Threat Detection And Interdiction. The overall 
TNT series, and this particular batch of experiments, directly apply toward 
sharing coalition information. They address the who, what, and how 
information gets shared in a multinational and multi-organizational 
environment, and so the lessons learned from the exercise are relevant to 
identifying ideal processes and tools for maximum efficiency in sharing 
information. 
The record of these experiments come from a test database for the 
NATO Coaltion Warrior Interoperability eXploration, eXperimentation, 
eXamination, eXercise (CWIX).  CIWX provides nations, agencies, commands 
and partners a stable, multi-domain, secure C4ISR testing environment (Allied 
Command Transformation Command & Control Deployability & Sustainability 
2013) in order to ensure member nations have the ability to: 
• Continuously improve interoperability effectiveness  
• Leverage the human interactions that occur especially during 
execution to capitalize on potential innovations 
A. TNT MIO 2012. 
Organizations and parties represented in TNT MIO 2012 included 
NATO, the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the NATO MIO 
Training Center (NMIOTC), Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
Defense (JCBRN) Center of Excellence (CoE), U.S. European Command 
(EUCOM), Norwegian Naval Special Operations Command (NORNAVSOC), 
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and Canada SOF (NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA 2012). This serves as a 
good representation of the “who” in coalition operations with parties from 
multiple nations, organizational types, and government agencies both military 
and civilian. 
Together, these organizations conducted a series of MIO field 
experiments that included the use of networks, advanced sensors and 
collaborative technology to support integrated detection and interagency 
collaboration (Bordetsky and Netzer 2010).  Disparate forces engaged in a 
common mission and attempted to fuse information gleaned from a variety of 
means with a goal of sharing and cooperating in order to conduct multilateral 
operations. 
Finally, we examine the “how” of information sharing. Specific 
technology areas examined during the experiments of June 2012 include: ad 
hoc mobile networking architecture, information management architecture, 
surveillance techniques, cooperative C2 and interoperability constraints, cyber 
distortion, knowledge and social networking architecture, visibility and 
vulnerability, and capturing of models (NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA 
2012). Each of these areas either  support or directly apply to coalition 
information sharing.   
1. Situational Awareness 
Arguably, one of the most important aspects of networking as applied 
to military operations is the situational awareness (SA) of a common operating 
picture (COP) created by combining sensors and reporting data. Through the 
use of friendly situational reports and sensor data and observations of hostile 
forces that are aggregated and displayed, the reviewing organizations gain an 
orientation to the operational area and the task at hand. To that end, 
information should be continuously updated in order to maximize the SA of  




 Situational Awareness (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA Figure 6. 
2012) 
Unfortunately, in the transfer from an unclassified system to a classified 
system, in this case BICES, both time and file fidelity were compromised.  The 
combination of those losses results in a reduction of SA.  When different 
classification levels are involved, cross domain data transfer becomes 
extremely challenging due to the technical properties of typical network edge 
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devices.  For successful SA to be enabled by the proposed Koinonia network, 
the COP ought to reside on the same classification level of the inputs.  
Specifically, Koinonia will avoid a host of technical problems if the network is 
kept at an unclassified level. 
2. Loss of Functionality 
An inability to process standard file formats used in common 
applications created a loss of functionality, as shown in Figure 7.  The inability 
to send Google Earth .kml and .kmz files to the classified network forced a 
conversion to .jpeg for transfer.  The .jpeg images could not be used to render 
a live feed showing movement.  Rather, they only provided a time-delayed 
snapshot of the situation.  Additionally, .jpeg files cannot be manipulated 
using commonly available display tools like Google Earth or NASA’s open 
source World Wind virtual globe. 
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 Case for Functionality (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA Figure 7. 
2012) 
Maintaining material on the originating network allows operators to 
keep file functionality. So long as Koinonia lies on the same classification level 
as open and crowdsourced material, it will be possible to maintain full 
functionality of the files as well as to maintain real time reporting. 
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3. Overreliance on Satellite Communications 
Data paths from the mobile teams involved using low bandwidth mobile 
satellite services. These satellite services are subject to outages, as in Figure 
8.  Outages can occur for a variety of reasons including lease limitations, 
weather, and equipment issues.  Also, they required the unit to stop moving, 
set up the antenna, and then conduct communications.  Further, the cost for 
satellite time is high, so that usage must be kept to a minimum, even if the 
host country can afford the initial cost of the system.   
 
 Reliance on Satellite communications (From NPS MDSRP, Figure 8. 
USSOCOM, DTRA 2012) 
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Using terrestrial commercial services can obviate the need for costly or 
limited access satellite communications usually utilized by well-funded military 
forces.  Providing a method for cellular communications allows for 
communications on-the-move and lowers cost compared to satellite 
communications.  This also allows for other parties to participate in the 
information gathering.  Just as data collected from cell phones was used in a 
Disaster Relief situation via the Ushahidi platform (Chlebo, Christman and 
Johnson 2011), so too could the general populace participate in information 
collection to accelerate populating Koinonia with data. 
4. Standardizing Message Format 
The experiment shows a requirement for standardized message 
formats.  Figure 9 reveals that the TNT MIO network was unable to provide 
the  track format required by the civilian COP.  The COP required a specific 
file type for input, in this case TSO or NVG.  The broadcast of TNT MIO tracks 
were not formatted for TSO or NVG and could not be converted.  The 
requirement of a specific format made ingestion of data into the civilian COP 
easy for their toolset to handle, but at the cost of making it less compatible 
with other broadcasts. The trial did not achieve success because incompatible 
message formatting standards were chosen and neither the data provider nor 
the recipient were capable of translating alternative formats. 
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 Message formatting (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA 2012) Figure 9. 
Requiring rigid messaging standardization in order to handle inputs is a 
double-edged sword.  The tighter the requirements, the less useful the 
network from an outsider’s perspective.  The more lose the requirements, the 
more difficult or costly to create data paths or converters for data ingestion.  
Koinonia would benefit from native compatibility with the message standards 
of cellular data, specifically SMS and MMS.  These simple messages can 
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build a creditable picture of the operation space via tools such as the 
previously mentioned Ushahidi platform (Chlebo, Christman and Johnson 
2011). 
5. File Format Compatibility 
Initially, the file format provided by TNT MIO was incompatible for entry 
into OTHTTS (Over The Horizon Tactical Tracking System).  Outlined in 
Figure 10, a work around was built to have OTHTTS draw from MCCIS 
(Maritime Command and Control Information System), which had been 
successfully receiving track information.  While this shows the importance of 
file format compatibility, it also illustrates that a robust toolset, MCCIS in this 
case, can mitigate shortfalls in a system.   
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 File compatibility (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA 2012) Figure 10. 
Again, standardization for formatting is required. Koinonia would enjoy 
some advantage in a relatively limited scope for open source data.  These 
include webpages, blogs, social media sites, as well as the discussed inputs 
from Ushahidi.  A common element for all of these is the extensive use of 
XML readable feeds.  Thus XML-based routing for inputs could be a powerful 
tool in the Koinonia network. 
 45 
6. Standardizing the Network 
Unclassified workstations were used to communicate with the 
operational elements, shown in Figure 11.  Receipt of all traffic was easily 
accomplished at this level of classification.  Most difficulties arose from the 
cross-domain transfer of data to a higher level of classification. 
 
 Network standardization (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA Figure 11. 
2012) 
While not explicitly tested, testers identified the need to maintain data 
on a network accessible by all forces. This can be accomplished by 
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maintaining and working with the data at the original level of classification.  As 
Koinonia would be drawing from unclassified open source material, it should 
maintain that level of classification for the network, permitting availability to all 
parties and use with all openly available toolsets. 
7. Interoperability 
In the test describes in Figure 12, messages were successfully passed 
over two systems by creating a workaround which translated one message 
format into another.  A robust toolset capable of interpreting multiple 
alternative formats is a powerful resource in coalition operations since it can 
be used as an interpreter between two other systems which would otherwise 
be unable to communicate.  In the test described below, Cursor-on-Target 
(COT) messages had to be translated into Over-the-Horizon-(OTH) Gold 




 Interoperability (From NPS MDSRP, USSOCOM, DTRA 2012) Figure 12. 
The workarounds created for the test proved effective, but the key to 
success will be adhering to a standard from the beginning of a program in 
order to minimize conversion middleware in a system. Minimization of such 
middleware will lower overall costs and barriers to interoperability, resulting in 
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a system more accessible to all parties. The lesson for Koinonia it that it must 
be compatible with the standards of partner organizations, while keeping 
requirements and system cost manageable.  
B. TNT MIO 2013 
A follow on series of experiments was set up for 2013.  Performed and 
reported during CWIX 2013, days prior to this documents submission for 
publication, two reports are instructive regarding sharing information with 
coalition partners. 
1. Pushing Track Data 
Test 15 was resolved and provides a good indication for the rest of the 




State Limited Success 
Modified 071258Z JUN 2013 
Name of Test Case 
lead Steve Mullins 
Test Case Lead Email 
Address sjmullin@nps.edu 
Data Provider Name 2013-USA - NPS TNT-MIO 
Data Consumer Name 2013-NATO - FaaS 
Test Description 
SHORT TITLE: Transmit live land/maritime Track Data 
 
OPERATIONAL PROBLEM: RB SMEs and Coalition HQs require 
live track data feeds from forward operators in order to 
maintain SA and oversee adjudication of Maritime or Land 
interdiction operations. These elements may be operating at a 
higher (classified) domain level when required to assist in 
detecting, locating, tracking, intercepting suspect 
ground/maritime vehicles during interdiction operations. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION: Can CENETIX users transmit track 
data over the internet with NATO/coalition element command 
posts via this tool? 
 
OBJECTIVE: Share Decision Support information between MIO 
forward elements and Reachback SMEs (Coalition HQs) with 




sharing of specific track feeds via diode 
Steps:  
1. Transmit CoT (TNT-MIO) from mobile device in XML file 
format. 
2. Capture CoT on CENETIX (nps.edu) server and rebroadcast 
via UDP. 
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3. Receive CoT (TNT-MIO) XML track from an external TNT-
MIO portal, through diode. 
4. Capture UDP stream into text files stored on CWIX low side 
folder. 
5. Use diode to push text file from CWIX low to high. 
6. Import XML track files into tracking software. 
 
POC at CMRE: Steve Horn 
Describe the 
verification process 
for a successful 
result 
a. CRITERIA.  
For each message, Report: 
- Receipt (SUCC = Message is received {1,0}) 
- Parsing (SUCC = Message is parsed {1,0}) 
- Valid (SUCC = Message is validated {1,0}) 
- Display (SUCC = Track/Position is displayed) T = {P, S, C, 
Alt, Trk-ID, IconID, Lat} 
 
b. CONSTRAINTS. 
- Single IP source 
 
c. INTEGRATION VARIABLES.  
Report: 
- Position (SUCC = accurate to 1/10 minute) 
- Speed (SUCC correct speed to nearest knot) 
- Course (SUCC = correct in degrees true to closest degree) 
(optional) 
- Altitude (SUCC = expect: 0 for maritime) (optional) 
- Track ID (SUCC = correct number, etc) 
- Identity (SUCC = correct Icon color; Blue/Red, etc)  
- Latency (Measurement time, or time of position fix) 
Service description 
from C3 Taxonomy 
MAR - Technology for Information, Decision and Execution 
Superiority (TIDE) Sensor Services 
Which "X" best 
describes this test 
case 
eXperimentation 
Date(s) test will be 
executed 06 June 2013 
Time(s) test case will 
be executed 1000Z 
Estimated time it will 
take to complete the 
test 
30 minutes 
Next date test case 
will be retested 10 June 2013 
Message Type  
Message Format Text 
File Format (MIME 
type) .xml 
Application Protocol CoT 
Transport Layer 




Unrelated to CWIX scenario; situation based on separate NPS 
MIO Experiment where NATO SOF are pursuing notional 
rad/nuc materials smugglers in real time, across Germany and 
Poland. Live experimentation. 
Data Consumer 
Result (larger field) 
Specific criteria: 
SUCCESS for criteria 1-3 
SUCCESS for Integration Variables: P, S, Track ID. C, A not 
sent (optional) 
SUCCESS regarding latency: no testbed system latency, 
however refresh rate was set at 3-5 seconds - which is will 
within acceptable parameters. 
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Track data was passed but the connection between the 
positions did not transfer. Thus tracks became a collection of 
unrelated positions with no track line connecting them. The 
track data transferred correctly; the shortfall was visualizing 
it. 
What Final State do 
you recommend Limited Success 




Was changes made to 
make the test 
successful 
Custom software written by NPS coder to capture UDP stream 
and convert to a single CoT XML text file. This file was 
overwritten with each track update.  
 
Custom software written by CMRE coder to read single CoT 
XML text file every five seconds and write a new CoT XML file 
named with date and time. 
If the test result was 
not "success", 
explain the result 
CMRE COP did not show track history. 
What were the 
problems 
encountered and the 
impact involved 
Custom NPS software could not generate a sequence of 
discreet timestamped XML text files. 
Created 260012Z JAN 2013 
Created By Steve Mullins 
Modified By Brian Hillers 
 Test report for pushing track data (Allied Command Transformation Figure 13. 
Command & Control Deployability & Sustainability 2013). 
Here again the difficulties of cross-domain solutions and differing file 
formats impeded the collection and display of data.  Key to information 
sharing on a coalition network will be the use of common standards for 
messaging on all communicating networks. 
2. Pushing Chat Cross Domain 
A web-based chat application, Observer Notepad (ON), is used for C2 
of the TNT MIO experiment.  A test goal was to export the content of this 
dialogue to a higher level of classification for monitoring.  As described in 
Figure 14, two difficulties prevented the test from taking place this year.  First, 
the higher domain requires a PKI certificate for authentication, and certificates 
are not currently implemented in Observer Notepad.  Second, the Extensible 
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) format is required by the recipient 
for the chat messages to be imported.  This protocol is one which ON does 
not support.  While this test could not be accomplished during CWIX 2013, the 
team expects to implement changes to format and  inclusion of authentication 





State Performing draft 
Modified 071333Z JUN 2013 
Name of Test Case lead Steve Mullins 
Test Case Lead Email 
Address sjmullin@nps.edu 
Data Provider Name 2013-USA - NPS TNT-MIO 
Data Consumer Name 2013-USA - Chat 
Test Description 
Transmit threaded text chat data via Observer Notepad tool 
 
working POC: Eileen 
Describe the 
verification process for 
a successful result 
CRITERIA: 
- Receipt (SUCC = Chat received) {1,0} 
 
CONTRAINTS: 
- Single IP source 
 
INTEGRATION VARIABLE: 
- Chat received at interface 
Service description 
from C3 Taxonomy 
MAR - Technology for Information, Decision and Execution 
Superiority (TIDE) Sensor Services 
Which "X" best 
describes this test case eXploration 
Transport Layer 
Protocol UDP / IP v4 
Corresponding Scenario 
Activity Description NA 
Data Consumer Result 
(larger field) Not tested. 
What Final State do you 
recommend Inteorperability Issue 




Was changes made to 
make the test 
successful 
Fix not feasible with the time constraints of CWIX. Tentatively 
planning to reattempt in 2014. 
If the test result was 
not "success", explain 
the result 
NPS CENETIX chat protocol does not use PKI authentication or 
xmpp format, but AFRL chat requires certificate authentication and 
xmpp format. Chat protocol will require alteration to achieve 
compatibility with transverse chat. 
 
Self-signed certificates will work and can simulate trusted 
Certificate Authority (CA) certificates. 
 
2014: Rebuild chat protocol to use xmpp and certificates. This 
format and authentication will enable cross-domain chat in both 
directions with AFRL chat server. Download AFRL server and client 
for testing. 
What were the 
problems encountered 
and the impact involved 
 
Created 260007Z JAN 2013 
Created By Steve Mullins 
Modified By Oscar Simmons 
 Test report for cross domain chat (Allied Command Transformation Figure 14. 
Command & Control Deployability & Sustainability 2013). 
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While useful to the TNT MIO team, Observer Notepad represents a 
nonstandard format chat tool.  This is an element to stay away from in 
coalition information sharing.  Simple functionality, like chat, can be brought to 
the Koinonia network with a variety of available standard tools that utilize 
industry standard protocols which aid interoperability. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. TYPE OF FRAMEWORK NEEDED 
1. Classification 
There is no benefit from an unclassified network where a Secret 
network already exists, as between NATO allies. If CENTRIX or BICES 
networks already provide the ability to collaborate and share information at 
the Secret level and below, then those systems can do everything that 
Koinonia promises, and more. Therefore the types of coalitions with whom the 
U.S. military would conceivably use a Koinonia network would be those with 
non-allied partner nations and NGOs with whom a classified network 
connection does not exist. In such coalitions it may not be possible or even 
desirable to share classified data. These coalitions would benefit from an 
enhanced ability to share unclassified information. 
The fact that the information exchanged across a network with partners 
such as these must be unclassified does not mean that it must be unprotected 
or public. Since we are discussing the exchange of information that could 
include intelligence and the factor that distinguishes this from other types of 
information is the necessity of some degree of secrecy (Warner 2002), then 
clearly unclassified intelligence data would not be public, open, or unprotected 
from disclosure. The network should then be capable of processing Sensitive 
but Unclassified information, such as that restricted in distribution to data “For 
Official Use Only (FOUO).”  Despite such data not being classified or marked 
NOFORN (Not releasable to foreign nationals), it should be protected from 
unauthorized disclosure, and so there is a necessity for information assurance 
measures designed to protect it. 
Typical procedure is the first item in need of change.   The U.S. 
military’s default modus operandi of uploading all ISR data to a classified 
network is not dictated by policy. If ISR data were put on the domain 
appropriate to the data’s level of classification, as it should be, then expanded 
sharing of unclassified information becomes feasible. The policy goal for the 
architecture is consistent with Joint Intelligence doctrine.   
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The architecture supporting this type of environment must be dynamic, 
flexible, and capable of providing multinational partners and 
interagency participants rapid access to appropriate data. It must 
facilitate the capability of the Intelligence Community to focus on 
supporting the JFC and subordinate joint force components and to 
integrate support from non-DoD agencies and NGOs as needed. (U.S. 
Department of Defense 2007) 
2. Data Transfer 
There is no technical constraint that restricts a network intended to 
share unclassified ISR or C2 data to only that data. An unclassified computer 
network has the technical capability of sharing any type of data, so rules 
governing its usage could potentially permit the processing of types of 
unclassified data beyond its primary or original purpose. For example, 
unclassified C2 data might easily be shared across the same network. 
However, routing of traffic with disparate sources, especially material brought 
from public internet sources, presents a problem.  One way to mitigate this is 
through use of Extensible Markup Language (XML) routing. 
XML routing using the N.25 protocol (compliant with the National 
Information Exchange Model) (NIEM 2010) has a valuable lesson for 
message interoperability.  A message format that is exhaustively large and 
has data fields for all relevant message types will be able to accept data from 
any compatible format.  Then algorithms can be written for each pair of 
message formats which need to be exchanged to translate from related fields 
in the input to the closest corresponding field in the output.  In this manner, 
interoperability can be achieved between systems that rely on dissimilar data 
formats by means of translation algorithms and a new large, universal format 
type able to directly accept data from any existing formatting system. This 





 XML routing architecture (From Hall 2012). Figure 15. 
3. Applications and Data 
An unclassified domain will have access to a plethora of Internet 
resources that are less easily accessed from classified domains. These 
include social media sources of publicly available intelligence, like Facebook 
and Twitter, as well as Google’s resources such as Earth and Maps with 
Street View, or their open and free non-proprietary alternatives, like Open 
Street Map. It will also permit the use of tools like Ushahidi, which is designed 
for mobile crowdsourcing, and Sahana, the free and open source disaster 
management software. Cloud, social, and mobile computing are big trends in 
IT (Egan 2011). It is desirable that Koinonia take advantage of those 
increasingly significant areas. APAN is another web-based collaboration 
portal and toolset being developed by DoD’s Defense Information Systems 
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Agency (DISA) and accessible over the public Internet. (Chlebo, Christman 
and Johnson 2011). 
4. Information Assurance 
An unclassified network designed to enable the aggregation and 
sharing with coalition partners of ISR or C2 data could implement information 
assurance (IA) controls such as those identified in the NSA’s Suite B as 
appropriate for the protection of classified information. These IA measures are 
not classified, and the standards and protocols they employ are public. 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cryptographic products are available that 
meet the NSA’s requirements, and these would be suitable for use on an 
unclassified domain (National Security Agency 2009).   
B. CAPABILITIES REQUIRED 
1. Clarify Requirements for Coalition Data Sharing.  
Requirement Conclusion 
Purpose/mission Operations other than war 
Classification Unclassified 
Access Military, Government, NGO, IGO 
Duration Mission length 
Mutual Benefit Collaboration through sharing 
information 
Centralized decision making Integration for a common 
operational picture 
Trusted network Information assurance controls 
Technology COTS, XML routing 
Data Inputs Standardized messages 
Interoperability Message format conversion 
Table 4.   Requirements and Conclusions. 
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This Koinonia network is designed to address the need for a mission-
specific network that need only exist for the duration of the mission. It is a 
small, tactical network, not a large permanent network. This will permit 
instances of it to be tailored to the particular set of partners suitable for a 
given mission. Small size enables inexpensive hardware and software to be 
used, and permits a network to be rapidly deployable. 
Thus the solution is a temporary network that does not compete with 
large, permanent networks with more extensive capabilities but which are 
more costly to quickly build in a new environment. 
The requirement that it be rapidly deployable for emergent tasking and, 
for example, usable in the critical early phase of a humanitarian assistance or 
disaster relief mission, will mean that it is light and transportable. This size 
limitation from the transportability requirement means that it will only scale up 
so far. Deployable infrastructure will not support thousands of users. 
2. Points of Vulnerability.   
Classified networks can employ stringent security measures and 
control the pool of users that access them, but a network such as Koinonia is 
designed to by employed between both trusted military users and relatively 
unknown non-allied foreign military personnel and civilians from regional or 
international organizations. The degree of security that can be achieved is 
significantly less. It would probably not be possible, for example, to issue PKI 
tokens to aid workers from the International Red Cross sufficiently quickly to 
enable them to use the network effectively within the first 48 hours of a 
humanitarian crisis. There is no possibility of knowing ahead of time which 
personnel will require access, and no time to execute the tedious 
administrative protocols necessary to implement PKI security during an 
emergency. 
Recommendation:  A JSOTF or similar small tactical unit needs timely 
and efficient information sharing, through good business processes using a 
secure and available network, with enterprise architecture designed to 
facilitate sharing unclassified information. National security strategy and joint 
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military doctrine recognize the need for increased agility in this area. A JSOTF 
often conducts missions of limited duration requiring specific capabilities from 
a wide range of possible requirements. The proposed potential solution set 
can improve upon the shortfalls of existing business processes and network 
capabilities. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
1. Expanded Utility of Data Sharing Beyond ISR or C2 
An information exchange system that is capable of sharing ISR data, 
which often entails full motion video and other bandwidth-intensive products, 
will probably be suitable for applications other than ISR or C2. 
2. Independent Network 
The CWIX experimentation relied on a NATO network for collection 
and dissemination of data.  Building the network stack and workstations for a 
rapidly deployable and affordable mobile network on which to implement 
Koinonia is a necessary step for practical development and experimentation. 
3. Expand Points of Collection 
The experiment collected sensor data from dedicated teams of 
operators.  Opening the aperture for collection to other types of information 
gathering utilizing tools such as Ushahidi, Sahana, and Open Street Maps 
would demonstrate the utility of an unclassified domain for multinational 
information sharing.   
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